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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

THIRTEENTH AND WASHINGTON STREETS CORPORATION,
a California Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant)

1

l

vs.

Case No.

7875

CL.A.RENCE

c~.

NESLEN, ELLIOTT

\V-. E\-rANS, H. D. LOWRY, and
~L-\R,TIN J. BERTOCH,
Defendants and Respondents.

)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondents agree generally with the appellant's
Statement of F·acts. It is believed, however, that the
Court would be aided by a reference to some additional
facts a.nd by a brief comment on some of the facts set ·
out by app·ellant.
1
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The respondents paid rent in full for the entire
period of their occupancy of the premises and there is
no contention on the part of the appellant that there was
a delinquency in this regard. The action seeks only to
recover rent for a period subsequent to the vacating of
the premises by the- respondents (R. 1).
During the period of the occupancy, complaints as
to conditions in the building were made continuously
and frequently (R. 38, 72). They were made not only
by the respondents themselves (R. 38, 72) but by their
employees (R. 58) as well as by other tenants in the
building (R. 64, 97). It appears that the complaints were
made to various representatives of the lessor, including
Mr. Kipp, Mr. Smith, Mr. Dayton and Mr. Kotila (R.
38, 58, 64, 72, 73). The complaints covered a variety
of grievances including the failure to keep the building
open after 8 P.M_. in the evening (R. 62, 68), inadequate
heat during both winters (R. 39, 57, 58, 64), unsatisfactory restroom facilities (R. 39, 57, 58, 63, 107), the
hazards and inconvenience of using the· stair well resulting from lack of light (R. 33, 63, 69, 107), lack of cleanliness (R. 107), the leaving of beauty parlor supplies
and janitorial supplies on the staircase (R. 32, 69), and
permitting the operation of the beauty parlor in the
foyer of the building with the attendant obnoxious
odors (R. 35, 70). The complaints covered conditions
the existence of which made the premises unsuitable for
a law o:ffice. Furthermore, the conditions complained
of were such that the building could not be held to be a
2
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.. First Class" building as lessor's agent represented it
would be.
The only other attorney in the building, 1fr. Herbert B. ~I a"", also testified to the existence of conditions
that were not con1patible with the effective operation
of a law office. He termed the situation "humiliating"
and "uncomfortable" and testified that the conditions
re1nained unchanged (R. 61-66).
Notwithstanding the variety and frequency of the
complaints, little was done to remedy the· situat~on (R.
64). The lack of remedial action appears to have been
attributable to the lessor's representatives in New York
City rather than the local agents (R. 64, 73, 102).
The written lease between the parties contained the
follo"'~ng specific provision:
''25. The building will be open from 8 A.M.
until 12 P.M. Tenants desiring the use of office
before or after these hours should apply at building office for p·ermission." (R. 17).
Notwithstanding this specific p~rovision, the building
was closed every evening at about 8 P.M. (R. 92, 105,
68, 29, 62).
During the period of their occupancy of the
premises, the respondents made inquiries for suitable
space in other offi·ce buildings. They were, however,
unable to locate suitable space unti'l shortly before they
1noved out of the leased premises (R. 48, 74).
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
The facts as found by the lower court constitute a
constructive eviction.
The acts and omissions of appellant which the Court
found to have been committed or omitted are set out
in Findings No. VI to and including No. XIII (R. 113-4).
These- acts were cumulative and continuing. Perhaps
no one of them, standing alone, would have been sufficient to constitute a constructive eviction but all of them
together, did in the opinion of respondents as well as
the trial Court, constitute such eviction.
Appellant contends that acts of omission do not
constitute an eviction, however, the authorities set forth
in appellant's brief do not support this contention.
F'urthermore, there were in this case more than omissions. There were, in addition, certain affirmative acts
committed by appellant, an example being the locking
of the building with the result that the· building was not
open to clients of respondents after 8 P.M. and on Sundays and holidays. The appellant also rented space in
the lobby of the building to the beauty parlor operator.
As a result of the operation of this parlor, the lobby
passageway and stairway, which were required to be
used by respondents and their clients, were obstructed
(Ex. 1 and 2). As a further result of the operation of
the beauty parlor, obnoxious fumes and odors were created which permeated respondents' office suite.
4
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Appellant contends that respondents did not show
that the appellant's actions were made with intent to
evict. The intention of the landlord is in1material if the
acts or omissions of the landlord interfere with the
beneficial enjoyn1ent of the premises by the tenant.
·~ . .-\

n1an is presumed, in law, to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts;
and, therefore, acts or on1issions of the landlord
'vhich are calculated to, and do, make it necessary
for the tenants to remove from demised premises
constitute a constructive eviction."
36 C. J. Landlord and Tenant, S·ec. 989, Page

263.
The following statement from an Oregon case 1n
our opinion correctly states the law:
''lT pon these questions an examination of the
authorities disclose a wide diversity of judicial
opinion but we think, except in certain cases
'vhere the intent of the landlord is valuable in
deter1nining the nature of the acts performed,
the intent is iininaterial, since the vital fact to be
determined is the interference with the tenant's
beneficial enjoyment of the premises. And in
the case at bar, if the action of the landlord did
work such an interference, the intent with which
he acted is of no imp·ortance."

Hotel l\1arion Co. v. Waters (1915), 77 Or.
426, 150 Pa.c. 865, at page 868.
5
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The Supre1ne Court of Utah in discussing the subjects of actual eviction and constructive eviction quotes
from Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
''Actual eviction is an actual expulsion of
the tenant out of all or some part of the demised
premises; a physical ouster or dispossession from
the very thing granted or some substantial part
thereof. e • 8
"Constructive eviction. *
With reference
to the relation of landlord and tenant there is a
'Constructive eviction' when the former, without
intent to oust the latter, does some act which
deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment
of the demised premises or n1aterially impairs
such enjoyment* @."
$

•

111<

Barker v. Utah Oil Refining Co. (1947), 111
Utah 308, 178 P. (2d) 386 at page 388.
The appellant contends that the results of the conditions complained of were not grave, substantial and
permanent. They were indeed grave and substantial
to the respondents who, together with their employees
and clients had to face the situation daily during the
period of more than two years they occupied the premises. There was not, nor could there be, any beneficial
enjoyment of the premises under the conditions which
existed during the entire period of respondents' occupancy. The conditions described by respondent Evans
6
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(R·. 23 to 55), by respondent Ne~len (R. 66 to 81), by
Ma..x 1{. Mangum, .who occupied a portion of the space
leased, and \vho is a lawyer (R. 106 to 109), by Mrs.
Beverly Fisher, a stenographer employed in the office
of the respondents, at the time they occupied the premises (R. 56 to 60), and by Herbert B. Maw, a. lawyer,
who also occupied space in the building, cannot under
any circumstances be correctly classified as not grave
and substantial. ~Ir. ~Iaw outlined the procedure that
had to be followed in meeting clients at his office during
evening hours or on Sundays or holidays. He described
the situation and summed it up by saying:
"Yes, it was a humiliating process." (R. 62,
line 30).
The law is a dignified and learned profession and
the offices of lawyers are usually located in "First Class"
office buildings with clean accommodations and surroundings \vhich meet the approval of the p,ublic. Certainly
the conditions which appellant created, or p·ermitted
to exist in the building were grave and substantial and
interfered with the use and enjoyment of the premises
by the respondents for the use which said premises were
intended, which, as the lease specifically provided, was
for an attorneys' office (R. 8).
Appellant contends that it cannot be held responsible for the fumes and odors arising from the beauty
parlor which it permitted to occupy a portion of the
foyer or lobby and for the obstructions which the opera7
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tion of said beauty parlor caused in the lobby and stairway, which respondents, their employees and clients
were required to use on occasions. It would not appear
reasonable to perrnit the landlord to escape from the
consequences of leasing space to a beauty parlor without
making adequate provision for the elimination of obnoxious odors and fumes, yet practically the on'ly source
of ventilation was the stairway going to the upper floors
(R. 100). Under the circumstances, the obnoxious odors
and fumes inevitably filled not only the lobby of the office
building through which respondents' clients had to pass
but also permeated to the portion of the building occupied by respondents. The evidence is without dispute
that the equipment used in the beauty parlor, of necessity obstructed the hall and passage way and was in
plain view of persons waiting for elevators to go to the
upper floors of the building (Ex. 2). The appellant
must also be deemed to be chargeable with pe-rmitting
this condition to exist.
Numerous cases have decided that under particular
facts landlords become responsible for actions of other
tenants and nuisances created by other tenants and that
such actions constitute constructive eviction. In an early
Colorado case it was held that a tenant was justified
in abandoning his rooms and treating himself as evicted,
where his landlord rented adjacent rooms to lewd women,
knowing the purpose for which the rooms were to be
used, and thereafter, on complaint as to their noisy and
offensive conduct, took no steps to remove them.
8
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Lay v. Bennett (1864), 4 Colorado Appeals
252, 35 Pac. 748.
Certainly, where the landlord, as in this case, rents
a portion of the building, to a business, the operation
of which naturally causes obnoxious fuines and odors,
without n1aking any provision for ventilation of the
space so as to prevent the fumes and odors from going
into the remainder of the building to the annoyance of
other tenants, the landlord cannot escape the natural
results from the operation of business by that tenant.
The landlord attempts to escape from the adinitted
annoyance and discomfort caused by the operation of
this beauty parlor by attempting to pass the blame for
its location to Mr. Neslen, one of the respondents. Appellant's brief refers to a letter written by respondent
Neslen on behalf of the operators of the beauty parlor.
This letter was written by Mr. N eslen in his capacity
as attorney representing clients. The reference in the
letter to the desirability of moving the! beauty parlor
from the department store to the lobby of the office·
building was made at the instance of the clients and represented their proposal and desire in the prernises (R.
75, 76). The suggestion, however, has no relevancy to
the question here involved, which is as to whether or
not the beauty parlor and its operation constituted an
obstruction and interference with the. respondents' enjoyment of the demised premises. Specifically, the question is as to whether or not the use of the hallways,
9
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stairways and passageways by the· beauty parlor for
the storage of their supplies and equipment and the
creation of obnoxious odors created conditions that
weTe detrin1ental to the enjoyment of the premises by
respondents for the purpose for which they leased the
prerruses.
Appellant cont~nds that the conditions must be not
only grave and substantial in order to constitute a constructive eviction 'but that they must also be permanent.
The bad conditions were in fact permanent in one sense,
in that they existed for more than two years during which
period the· respondents occupied the premises. An examination of the authorities cited by appellant shows
that they do not support the theory that the acts of the·
landlord must be permanent in the sense that the situation created cannot be remedied by the landlord.
In a New York case it was held that there was a
constructive eviction where the landlord notified tenant
that use of passenger elevator in an apartment building
by tenant's governess would no longer be pe·rmitted.
The landlord was not authorized to refuse to allow governess to use the elevator, and the tenant accepted the
noti~e as an ultimatum.
Park Ave. M. E. Church vs. Barrett, 30
N.Y.S. 2nd 667.

It is contended by the appellant that respondents
did not move from the premises within a reasonable
10
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time because of the conditions and that they therefore
waived their right to n1ove. This contention see1ns very
inconsistent with the strenuous argument to the effect
that respondents at no time had the right to 1nove. The
facts supported by the record and found by the lower
court are that respondents moved as soon as they found
suitable quarters (R. 38, 73 and 114). Up to the time
that respondents moved the conditions con1plained of
had not been remedied.
The following citations support the position of the
respondents in staying in the premises until they were
able to find suitable space to meet their needs:
Where the lessee continued in possession over a
year it was held that lessee did not waive dust and
smoke nuisance from lessor's ·heating p1ant, where plant
was not operated much of the time and lessee continually
complained thereof the rest of the time.
Frosh v. Sun Drug Co., 1932, 91 Colorado 440,
16 P. (2d) 428.
In the above case the Court stated on page 430 of
16 P. (2d):

"It is said that the company continued in
possession and paid rent for more than a year,
and thereby waived the injury. During much of
this time, however, the heating plant was not in
11
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operation, and there is ample evidence that during the· reJnainder the company was continually
complaining and demanding relief, and that Frosh
was continually promising action. Under such
circumstances, there is no waiver." (Several
cases are there cited).
In another Colorado case, J. C. Penney Co. vs. Birrell ( 1934) tried upon the theory of constructive eviction,
the question was raised as to whether the defendant
had waived any right to claim an eviction by his failure
to abandon within a reasonable time. The defendant,
who successfully contended that he had been evicted
by acts of the plaintiff, delayed moving from ~he premises from March, 1930, to July 28, 1931. He looked for
other quarters, but found none available in the business
section and then decided to put up his own building and
kept possession of the leased premises until his building
could be erected. He was delayed by financing, building
and weather conditions. The Court stated:
"The case was tried upon the theory of
constructive eviction. Plaintiff seeks a reversal
by contending there was no eviction, and further
that if it could be so considered, that defendant
waived any right to claim an eviction by his
failure to abandon within a reasonable· time.
What is a reasonable time, depends solely upon
the facts peculiar to the case. The facts surrounding the latter claim were fully heard and
considered by the Court, and being determined
in defendant's favor upon sufficient evidence, will
not be disturbed."
12
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J. C. Penney Co. v. Birrell ( 1934), 95 Colorado 59, 32 Pac. (2d) 805 at p·age 806.
In a Massachusetts case, Ron1e v. ,Johnson ( 1931),
174 N.E. 716, the difficulty of finding another location

suitable for tenants' business was alluded to as a circumstance to be considered by the jury in deternlining
whether the tenant had acted with reasonable prornptitude.
Although there is no direct evidence to that effect,
it is believed the Court could reasonably take judicial
notice of the fact that during the period in question,
office space, suitable for several practicing lawyers, was
extremely critical. The trial judge undoubtedly considered this as one of the circumstances which justified
respondents in remo:ving from the premises when they
did.
POINT II.
The findings of fact of the lower court are justified by
the evidence.

Appellant contends that it was error for the lower
Court to include in Findings of F·act XI, XII, and XIII
that the acts and omissions of appellant were "greatly
to the detriment of Defendants' professional practice."
Appellant recites the evidence on the subject and concludes that since the respondents did not and could not
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testify as to the loss of any clients or examples of the
loss of n1oney as the result of the conditions, that these
Findings are erroneous.
It is the contention of the respondents that the
Court n1ight make such conclusions from the facts established as may be reasonable and that the complained of
clauses in the Findings were reasonably concluded from
the facts proven.
The Utah Supreme Court in discussing the subject
said:
"The errors urged are ~ * * (2) that they
are 'not findings of fact but conclusions from
facts shown.' * :iF * The second complaint is no
objection at all. Findings should be limited to
the ultimate facts to be ascertained, and such
findings are none the less. findings of fact because
drawn as conclusions from other facts."
Fuller v. Burnett (1926), 66 U. 507, 243 P.
790.

If the inclusion of the clause, which appellant contends there is no evidence to support, in the three Findings of Fact was error on the part of the lower Court
said error is harmless error because the judgment can
be supported by the other findings.
It is finally contended by appellant that there is no
evidence presented to substantiate Finding XVII, "That
14
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the defendants moved fron1 and vacated said pre1nises
by reason of the acts and o1nissions of the plaintiff as

soon as they could find suitable quarters for their use

as attorneys' offices."
There \Vas no evidence offered to contradict the
testimony of Mr. Neslen and Mr. Evans on this subject.
Under these circrm1sta.nces it is submitted that there
was evidence to support the Finding.

In support of respondents' contention that the premises were vacated within a reasonable time, the following facts and circumstances are reiterated:

(a) The premises were occupied and rent paid
therefor for more than two years;
(b) During this entire time, complaints were
made frequently and continuously to the landlord setting forth intolerable conditions;
(c) During this entire time promises were made
on the part of the landlord that the conditions
\vould be remedied;
(d) The. conditions were 1n fact not remedied
during respondents' occupancy;

(e) The respondents vacated the premises when
suitable sp-ace became available in another
·building.
15
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These a.re the facts as supported by the evidence and
they support the Findings Inade by the· trial Court that
the premises were vacated within a r~asonable time.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The facts found by the Lower Court constitute a
constructive eviction justifying the respondents vacating
the· leased premises and the Findings of F·act of the
Lower Court are justified by the· evidence and there are
sufficient Findings of Fact to support the Conclusions
of Law and the Judgment of the Lower Court.
The Judgment of the Lower Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD W. ELTON,
Attorney for Defendants

and Respo'Y!'dents.
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